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MASS CRIMES ADJUDICATION IN INDONESIA: LEARNING FROM THE
CAMBODIAN EXAMPLE
Renée Harrison*

I. INTRODUCTION
Indonesia is a new democracy.1 There have been obvious successes
in the struggle to transition to this form of government.2 Indonesia has
even been used as a shining example of democracy for other Southeast
Asian countries like Thailand and Myanmar that struggle to institute
more democratic principles into their existing governments.3 Indonesia
has also been called “Southeast Asia’s most democratic nation.” 4
Notwithstanding all of these material successes, Indonesia has had a long
history of serious human rights violations that sorely need investigation
and prosecution.5
Arguably, the events that most need attention are a series of human
rights violations that occurred from 1965–66, mostly perpetrated against
those affiliated with the Communist party. The number of people who
were killed remains in dispute, although estimates range from five
hundred thousand to over a million.6 As many as 1.7 million people were
detained, and many others were tortured, beaten, and raped.7 The Central
Intelligence Agency reported it as one of the worst mass murders in the
twentieth century.8 Even though these events occurred almost fifty years
*
J.D. Candidate 2016, Brigham Young University Law School, Provo, Utah. The author would
like to thank Professor Eric Jensen for his helpful insight and direction through the writing process.
1
In 1998, Indonesia transitioned from an authoritarian regime under President Suharto to a
“new democratic dispensation.” See Edward Aspinall, The Irony of Success, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 20,
20–22 (2010) (outlining Indonesia’s democratic transition).
2
Id. at 20 (listing the decline of military political control, the resolution of peace in Aceh, the
expansion of civil liberties, and the freely contested multiparty elections). In addition, in 2004
Indonesia began direct presidential elections, whereas previously a legislature controlled by Suharto
had elected the president. Joe Cochrane, In Southeast Asia, Indonesia Is an Unlikely Role Model for
Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/world/asia/insoutheast-asia-indonesia-becomes-a-role-model-for-democracy.html (quoting Marcus Mietzner, an
Indonesia specialist at Australian National University). Indonesia experienced an almost unheard of
peaceful democratic transfer of power when it elected Joko Widodo as the next president. Id.
3
Id.; Melissa Crouch, Law Reform and Human Rights in Indonesia-Myanmar, 63 THE
NEWSLETTER 7 (2012).
4
Cochrane, supra note 2.
5
See Suzannah Linton, Accounting for Atrocities in Indonesia, 10 SING. Y. B. INT’L L. &
CONTRIBUTORS, 199, 199 (2006) (listing crimes against humanities in Jakarta, Aceh and Papua).
6
Robert Cribb, Genocide in Indonesia, 1965–1966, 3 J. GENOCIDE RES. 219, 219, 233 (2001).
7
TERESA BIRKS, NEGLECTED DUTY: PROVIDING COMPREHENSIVE PREPARATIONS TO THE
INDONESIAN “1965 VICTIMS” OF STATE PERSECUTION 11 (Int’l Cent. for Transitional Justice, ed.,
2006), available at http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Indonesia-Reparations-Victims-2006English.pdf.
8
Peter Dale Scott, The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965–1967, 58 PACIFIC
AFFAIRS 239, 239 (1985) (quoting CIA, Director of Intelligence, Indonesia—1965: The Coup that
Backfired, Report, p. 71) available at http://wvi.antenna.nl/eng/ic/pki/pds.html.

107

SUMMER 2015

Neither Forgive Nor Forget

ago, there is an acute need for this atrocity to be formally adjudicated.
Critics say that creating a tribunal to pin the blame on a few luckless
scapegoats would not help the victims of the crimes or help Indonesia
progress as a nation.9 However, establishing a court to examine those
particular crimes against humanity would serve significant domestic and
international interests.10
In recent decades there has been a proliferation of international
criminal courts.11 The most recent example of an international tribunal
formed to investigate and prosecute war crimes and human rights
violations is the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (the
ECCC, or the Cambodian court). It was established in 2006, and
although it has faced severe criticism, it has taken small, but important
steps toward its particular goals, and the goals of every tribunal of its
kind: to convict the perpetrators of egregious crimes against humanity,
provide healing and reconciliation for victims, advance domestic legal
capacity, and develop the international rule of law. 12 The ECCC
incorporated many novel features into its structure, many of which have
led to inefficiency, excessive expenditures, and subsequent criticism.13
Notwithstanding its many struggles and failures, the ECCC is still an
excellent experiment from which Indonesia could learn.
Not only is the ECCC the most current experiment in international
justice, but Cambodia’s situation also has striking similarities to that of
Indonesia. They are both nations with weaker legal systems transitioning
to democracy, and each faces the struggle of adjudicating mass human
rights crimes that took place decades before. Using the ECCC as a model
will help Indonesia avoid some of the mistakes and difficulties that have
assailed the Cambodian court, while at the same time taking significant
steps towards the protection of human rights and reconciliation of past
grievances.
Although these particular atrocities in Indonesia happened fifty
years ago, establishing an international court to begin addressing the
crimes is an endeavor worth pursuing. This endeavor would likely have
significant, positive ramifications both domestically and internationally.
The best way to design this new court to achieve these outcomes would
9

Linton, supra note 5, at 202.
See infra Part III.
11
Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 295 (2003).
7i8y12 Carla De Ycaza, Victor’s Justice in War Crimes Tribunals: A Study of the International
Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda, 23 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 53, 53–55 (2010) (outlining the goals of
developing the international rule of law, prosecution of past crimes, and reconciliation); Dickinson,
supra note 11, at 304 (indicating the importance of capacity-building).
13
Peter Maguire, Cambodia’s Troubled Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/opinion/29iht-edmaguire.html (referring to the “massive
budget overruns” and “conspicuously slow pace” of the court).
10
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be to examine the ECCC, model its successes, and avoid its failures.
Though Indonesia faces its own unique difficulties, its situation shares
key similarities with that of Cambodia. Learning from and altering the
model of the ECCC to implement its own court system would help
Indonesia address these mass human rights violations, vindicate its
victims, improve its own legal system, as well as help shape the
development of the international rule of law.
Indonesia faces many obstacles before it can even come close to
implementing a court system like the ECCC. It would have to secure
public support and institute major reforms of the military, judiciary,
police, and Attorney General’s office.14 Further, evidence suggests that
the Indonesian government would resist any sort of international
intrusion into its governance. 15 As necessary prerequisites to the
establishment of a court system, these steps deserve our attention and
examination. However, they go beyond the scope of this Comment and
will not be formally addressed.
Part II of this Comment will examine a brief history of the 1965
incident, relevant developments since that time, and the current political
atmosphere in Indonesia. Part III will address why these particular
crimes need adjudication, and specifically why an international hybrid
tribunal is the best forum for their adjudication. It will focus on the
important ramifications of such a court on both the domestic and
international levels. Part IV will address how Indonesia should approach
the establishment of an international tribunal, in part by presenting a case
study of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Part V
will explain how Indonesia should alter the Cambodian model to
implement an effective tribunal of its own.
II. BRIEF HISTORY AND CURRENT ATMOSPHERE
A failed military coup in the fall of 1965 set off the killings and other
atrocities that occurred in 1965 and 1966 in Indonesia.16 At that time,
14
Linton, supra note 5, at 203 (listing these things as obstacles to be overcome before efforts to
secure accountability in Indonesia will be successful); id. at 205–06 (discussing judicial corruption
and the legal system). The Attorney General’s Office has specifically resisted the investigation and
prosecution of the 1965–66 killings. See Information and Documentation on Impunity in Indonesia,
STOP IMPUNITY! (Oct. 31 2013), http://www.stopimpunity.org/page45.php. The National
Commission of Human Rights in Indonesia (Komnas HAM) can only follow up by requesting a
report of the investigation from the Attorney General’s office. Other forms of recourse are
unavailable. Id.
15
In East Timor, an ad hoc court was established to address human rights violations over the
resistance of Indonesia, and only because of constant International pressure. Linton, supra note 5, at
207, 218.
16
Cribb, supra note 6, at 231–33. Though the coup happened “early in the morning of October
1,” id. at 231, it is commonly called the 30 September Movement, and said to have occurred on
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President Sukarno led the country and the military held significant
power. 17 The Communist Party or PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia),
however, was gaining power under Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy”
regime.18 The party already claimed three million members at that time,
and it continued to gain new support when Indonesia experienced a
severe economic downturn.19 In the early morning of October 1, troops
raided the houses of several anti-communist generals.20 Three were shot
in their homes; three were taken to an Air Force base and later killed.21
The coup was poorly planned, and the army was able to end it within a
few days.22 While the issue remains highly contested,23 the PKI was
ultimately blamed for the uprising.24 Wild rumors and propaganda were
spread about the party, demonizing them and turning the entire nation
against them.25
In response to the public fear and outcry against the “Communist”
coup, Suharto, a rising political and military leader, and current
Lieutenant-General in the army’s Strategic Reserve, 26 was given the
authority to take “any steps necessary” to eliminate the PKI.27 To achieve
this goal, the military sanctioned the killing of Communists in any part of
Indonesia. 28 While the military sometimes took the lead role in the
killings, they commonly enlisted and provided local militias (mostly
consisting of local youth groups) to hunt out and eliminate party
affiliates.29 Sometimes entire villages were wiped out.30

September 30. See Sara Schonhardt, Veil of Silence Lifted in Indonesia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/world/asia/veil-of-silence-lifted-in-; BIRKS, supra note 7, at 9.
17
Cribb, supra note 6, at 229 (describing the strength of the army in government positions and
access to weapons).
18
“To most observers there appeared no doubt that the main beneficiary of Guided Democracy
was the Indonesian Communist Party.” Id.; see also id. at 229–31 (outlining Sukarno’s Guided
Democracy).
19
Id. at 229–30 (detailing the economic decline).
20
Id. at 231.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Several theories surround who might be behind the Coup, some of which implicate Sukarno
and Suharto besides the PKI. Id. at 231–32 (“Both the Communist Party and Sukarno had good
reason to want the removal of the high command. . . . Also possible is that the coup was to some
extent prompted or planned by the enemies of Sukarno and the communists in order to compromise
them. There is inconclusive but not entirely negligible evidence implicating both Suharto and the
American Central Intelligence Agency in this respect.”); see generally W.F. Wertheim, Whose Plot?
– New Light on the 1965 Events, 9 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 197 (1979).
24
Cribb, supra note 6, at 232.
25
For more specific details, see id. at 232. Besides the cruel September 30 killings, the PKI
were also blamed for the economic crisis. Id.
26
Id. at 231.
27
BIRKS, supra note 7, at 10.
28
Cribb, supra note 6, at 233.
29
Id.
30
Id.
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Estimates of how many people were killed vary widely, ranging
between hundreds of thousands and a million.31 However, over a million
more were arrested and detained without trial; those detained were
questioned, beaten, tortured, and raped; some were detained for up to
fourteen years. 32 The military and local militias targeted not only people
labeled as Communists, but also those directly, filially, or only loosely
connected to the PKI.33 Only 767 of these Communist affiliates were
actually convicted of a crime.34 Anyone classified as a Communist, or
having a broadly defined “relationship” with the party, was stigmatized,
denied the right to vote, and could not join the military or become a civil
servant.35
Although these events took place more than fifty years ago, they are
still pervasively influential in Indonesia, 36 and the victims and their
families still feel the effects.37 As of 2006, the military formally warned
the House of Representatives in Indonesia that sympathizers of the PKI
had infiltrated the House, implicating those who had “filial links” with
1965 detainees,38 and the government still requires school textbooks to
implicate the PKI when discussing the attempted coup of 1965.39
People in Indonesia rarely discuss these historical events involving
the PKI. However, people have recently begun to break the silence and
open up a dialogue about their difficult history.40 This discussion has
taken place in books and documentaries exploring the experience of
victims and questioning the actions of the leaders who still remain in
power today.41 In 2012, Indonesia’s National Commission on Human
Rights (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, or Komnas HAM)
31
See id. generally. There are many different estimates from different sources. General Sarwo
Edhie boasted up to three million had been killed; NGOs quote numbers up to one million. BIRKS,
supra note 7, at 10. Komnas HAM reported 1.5 million people killed. AGO Rejects Komnas HAM
Report on 1965 Massacres, JAKARTA GLOBE, Nov. 10, 2012, available at
http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/archive/ago-rejects-komnas-ham-report-on-1965-massacres/.
32
BIRKS, supra note 7, at 11.
33
Id. at 10.
34
Id. at 12.
35
Id. at 16–17.
36
See Schonhardt, supra note 16.
37
As recently as the nineties, 1965 victims were disenfranchised. BIRKS, supra note 7, at 17
(“In addition, the 1965 victims were prevented from voting or standing for any legislative positions,
including local, regional, and national elections.”). In 2006, there were warnings that the House of
Representatives had been “infiltrated by sympathizers of the PKI.” Id. at 26–27. (“These accusations
seem intended to target those members of parliament that have or are said to have filial links with ex
1965 political detainees based on the argument that you can’t guarantee that a child has broken away
from the ideology of his/her parents and that at the very least they have a historical grudge.”)
(citation and quotations omitted).
38
Id. at 26–27.
39
Schonhardt, supra note 16.
40
Id.
41
See id.; “Breaking the Silence,” by Putu Oka Sukanta, published in March 2014. “The Act of
Killing,” a documentary about the events, was released in 2012. The feature film “Seng Penari” was
released in 2011.
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conducted an in-depth, three-year investigation into the acts against the
PKI, declaring them a major abuse of human rights, and submitting an
850-page report to Indonesia’s Attorney General, urging an
investigation.42 Although the Attorney General claimed that the evidence
that Komnas HAM submitted was insufficient and refused to conduct an
independent investigation, 43 Komnas HAM’s actions show that the
events of 1965 and 1966 may still be present in the mind and culture of
Indonesians.
The current political situation in Indonesia provides an opportune
time to reopen investigation and to adjudicate these events. This year,
Indonesians democratically elected Joko Widodo (Jokowi) as their new
president. 44 His victory is a significant triumph for democracy in
Indonesia, since the power of the presidency transferred to the opposing
political party, and since Jokowi became the first president who did not
have significant ties to the former government under Suharto.45 This
could prove useful for a few reasons. Jokowi could use some of the
political momentum of the democratic transfer to address the human
rights tragedies in Indonesia, increasing the legitimacy of Indonesia in
the international sphere by showing that the “new” Indonesian
government does not stand for these crimes against humanity. Also,
because Jokowi appears to be more removed from the old government
and Suharto’s New Order,46 the extra distance might prove insulation
enough to implicate those who held power during that regime.
III. A NEED FOR ADJUDICATION: THE IMPORTANCE OF AN
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
Many human rights abuses have occurred in Indonesia that demand
redress, some of which have taken place recently and could be more
easily addressed than the mass killings of 1965–66.47 However, these
mass killings may be the best place to start. This remains one of the most
horrible massacres in Indonesia’s history; in terms of numbers it has had
the most far-reaching effects. Arguably these events still impact millions

42
Margareth S. Aritonang, Komnas HAM Declares 1965 Purge a Gross Human Rights
POST,
July,
23,
2012,
available
at
Violation,
JAKARTA
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/23/komnas-ham-declares-1965-purge-a-gross-humanrights-violation.html.
43
AGO Rejects Komnas HAM Report on 1965 Massacres, supra note 31.
44
Cochrane, supra note 2.
45
Since the transition from the Suharto regime, the last four presidents have all had significant
ties to the government under Suharto. Aspinall, supra note 1, at 21. Jokowi, on the other hand, was
not tied to the Suharto era, or to the military. Cochrane, supra note 2. See also Competing Visions,
THE ECONOMIST, July 5, 2014, available at http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21606285political-naif-represents-more-hopeful-future-indonesia-suharto-era (“[Jokowi] is not from the usual
clutch of political and business dynasties and their sleazy cronies.”).
46
Cochrane, supra note 2.
47
See Linton, supra note 5.
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of people.48 The fact that discussion of the issue still continues shows
that although it took place decades ago, it is still potently present in the
lives of Indonesians. The amount of effort and time that went into the
Komnas Ham report also shows the importance that Indonesians place on
addressing the issue. In addition, starting with this event could help set in
place a culture of adjudication that would be beneficial to the redress of
other, more recent crimes.
It is also important to approach these issues on an international level,
for example, by implementing an international tribunal. The worth of an
international tribunal is not especially evident when viewed from a
monetary standpoint. For example, the ECCC has spent $204.6 million
as of 2013, and only prosecuted a handful of people.49 Other international
courts do not have a better track record; the cost per indictment at the
ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia),
ICTR (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), and ICC
(International Criminal Court) was $11.2 million, $18.5 million, and $39
million, respectively.50 But the value of a court cannot be boiled down to
a dollar sign. Even if only a few people are convicted, the mere
establishment of a court has far-reaching influences. It helps a country
reconcile with a difficult part of its history; it helps with victim
vindication and healing. 51 It could specifically help Indonesia obtain
legitimacy in the international community, take steps toward
democratization, 52 and investigate and prosecute other human rights
violations. Perhaps most importantly, however, the use of an
international tribunal to adjudicate these crimes could have significant
consequences for the international community and the development of
the international rule of law.
Indonesia’s use of an international tribunal to address human rights
violations will help develop international law to more clearly define
specific crimes and to facilitate the adjudication of like crimes in the
48
An overwhelming 1.7 million people were detained. BIRKS, supra note 7, at 11. Also,
Suharto passed broad classifications that denied political and other rights of people only loosely
connected with the PKI. Id. at 15–17.
49
ECCC at a Glance, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, (Apr.
2014), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ECCC%20at%20a%20Glance%20-%20EN%20%20April%202014_FINAL.pdf.
50
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1031 (2d ed.
2012).
51
Seeta Scully, Judging the Successes and Failures of the Extraordinary Chambers of the
Courts of Cambodia, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 300, 303 (2011) (“There are two general schools
of thought concerning the primary purpose of international tribunals: tribunals as vindication of
human rights, and tribunals as social healing.”) (emphasis omitted).
52
Establishing the rule of law in Indonesia, as well as accounting for violations of human
rights, will help Indonesia in the path to democracy. Matthew Draper, Note, Justice as a Building
Block of Democracy in Transitional Societies: The Case of Indonesia, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
391, 391, 393 (2002); Jared Levinson, Indonesia’s Odyssey: A Nation’s Long, Perilous Journey to
the Rule of Law and Democracy, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 103, 103 (2001).
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future. In particular, an international tribunal could substantially expand
the definition of genocide. Genocide, as currently defined by the 1948
UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, is
“[committing an act] with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”53 This definition does not
include classifications such as political affiliation or social class. This is
meaningful, since so many of the massacres and killings that have
occurred, including the one in Indonesia, are outside this definitional
scope. A broadened meaning would further include the millions of deaths
during The Great Leap Forward in China, as well as the political and
social killings that took place in Russia.54 Currently, however, killings
like these are not labeled as genocide, and thus do not receive the same
recognition or moral condemnation.
This disparate treatment could be because political affiliation is said
to be a mutable trait, whereas the others are not. However, one could also
argue that people have the ability to choose their religion, and that the
fact that a choice is involved does not prevent killing on the basis of
religion from being encompassed in the definition of genocide. A
political affiliation is not so far off from a religious affiliation; both
involve closely held beliefs, ideas, and associations. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights gives people the right to freedom of
thought, conscience,55 opinion, expression, and peaceful assembly.56 This
does not specify a freedom to affiliate with a particular group, but carves
out enough space to accommodate that freedom.
Furthermore, although social class is not completely immutable, it
shares similar characteristics with ethnicity, race, and nationality, in that
it is often an assigned group—a classification that is not easily altered. A
foundational idea found in the UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide is the importance of being free from the “risk of
being killed by the state, and free[ ] from having your ‘group’ being the
target of violence,” 57 which should include political or social class
affiliation.
Precedent supports expanding the definition of genocide beyond the
express stipulations of the Convention on Genocide. The ICTR qualified
53
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art.
2,
Dec.
9,
1948
[hereinafter
Convention
on
Genocide],
available
at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2078/volume-78-I-1021-English.pdf.
54
See William Easterly et al., Development, Democracy, and Mass Killings, 11 J. ECON.
GROWTH 129, 149, 152 (2006); DAVID SCOTT, CHINA STANDS UP: THE PRC AND THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 39 (Routledge, ed., 2007) (commenting on the number of deaths caused by
the Great Leap Forward: “Social and class redistribution underpinned the internal radicalization
sought by Moa’s Great Leap Forward.”).
55
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS art. 18 (U.N. Dec. 10, 1948), available
at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a18.
56
Id. art. 19–20.
57
Easterly, supra note 54, at 130.
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rape and other forms of sexual violence as acts of genocide.58 Although
the tribunal fit rape under Article 2 of the Convention on Genocide as an
act “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,”59
its classification significantly deviated from the typical definition of
genocide60 and certainly paved the way for future courts to consider acts
of sexual violence when adjudicating genocide. This is a good example
of how an international tribunal had a palpable effect on the international
rule of law and great influence over future mass crimes courts.
Having a tribunal formally describe the mass killings of certain
political affiliates as genocide is no further stretch than a tribunal
including rape and sexual violence in the definition of genocide, and this
definition would encompass acts of violence almost indistinguishable
from those traditionally defined as genocide. Killing a group of people
because of their ideology has the same resonation whether that ideology
is political or religious.
Defining these violent crimes as genocide has important
ramifications. It would provide more vindication for victims, labeling the
atrocity committed against them as universally condemnable. Having an
international element in a mass crimes court will not only bring
vindication to victims and help develop the domestic legal system, but it
could have important ramifications in the international sphere as well. In
this particular case, adjudication of the Indonesian mass killings could
help expand the definition of genocide to include many atrocities almost
indistinguishable from those already covered.
IV. LEARNING FROM THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS
IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA
In establishing an international tribunal, it would be helpful to
closely examine the structure of the Cambodian court in order to form a
well-structured, more efficient model tailored to Indonesia’s specific
situation. Indonesia faces many of the same struggles as Cambodia, and
Cambodia’s court structure is therefore a good starting point. For
example, like Cambodia, a single leader in a despotic regime governed
Indonesia.61 Both countries struggled to transition to a democratic state,
58
Timothy Gallimore, The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
and its Contributions to Reconciliation in Rwanda, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. ANN. 239,
246–47 (2008).
59
Id.; Convention on Genocide, supra note 53.
60
Gallimore, supra note 58, at 246.
61
See generally, Aspinall, supra note 1, at 20–22; BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE,
POWER, AND GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE (Yale University Press, ed.,
2014).
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and both still have problems with governmental corruption. 62 Strong
military authorities have ruled each.63 The atrocities committed in both
countries also have similarities. Hundreds of thousands of people were
killed and detained, which left innumerable victims and suffering
families.64 Lastly, in both cases, the events took place decades in the
past.65 On the other hand, however, there are key differences between the
two countries’ situations. In particular, Indonesia has asserted its
sovereignty and resisted assistance from the international community,
whereas Cambodia requested international support to help set up a war
crimes tribunal. 66 Because of the similarities, Indonesia could use
Cambodia’s ECCC as a model to structure its own court, but the
differences between the countries would require significant changes in
the model to accommodate Indonesia’s specific situation and better meet
financial and efficiency goals.
Cambodia established the ECCC in 2006 to address the egregious
acts that took place during the Pol Pot era.67 In establishing the ECCC,
Cambodia requested the assistance of the UN,68 though it expressed a
desire to maintain sufficient domestic control over the proceedings.69 As
one of the first of a new breed, the ECCC is structured as a hybrid court
and implements many unique and innovative features.70 The court is split
into distinct domestic and international sides; it has both domestic and
international judges, co-prosecutors, and co-investigating judges.71 The
funding scheme is also divided.72 A “supermajority,” meaning a majority
vote that includes at least one international judge, is needed to secure
some judgments.73 The ECCC also has an ambitious civil participation

62

See infra notes 152, 154–55.
Helen Fein, Revolutionary and Antirevolutionary Genocides: A Comparison of State
Murders in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975 to 1979, and Indonesia, 1965 to 1966, 35 COMP. STUD.
SOC’Y & HIST. 796, 813 (1993) (highlighting the “coming to power of military leaders in the name
of the revolution, or for the defense against the revolution”).
64
See supra note 31
65
The Indonesian incident took place from 1965–66, almost fifty years ago. The Cambodian
killings took place from 1975–1979. See ECCC at a Glance, supra note 49.
66
See Linton, supra note 5.
67
Introduction to the ECCC, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA,
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/about-eccc/introduction (last visited Apr. 9, 2015).
68
Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning
the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, UN – Cambodia, June 6, 2003, G.A. Res. 57/228(B) [hereinafter UN Cambodian
Agreement].
69
John D. Ciorciari & Anne Heindel, Experiments in International Criminal Justice: Lessons
from the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 35 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 369, 415 (2014) (discussing the Cambodian
Government’s resistance of international control).
70
Id. at 371.
71
Id. at 372, 374.
72
Id. at 407.
73
Any decision of the Pre-Trial court requires an affirmative four out of five votes. In the Trial
Chamber, a guilty verdict requires four out of five votes, and an affirmative decision in the Supreme
Court Chamber requires five out of seven votes. Judicial Chambers, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS
63
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system for victims.74 The court does have its critics, some of which claim
that the ECCC is not a model to be cloned or that it is a mistake that
should be avoided.75 Notwithstanding these criticisms, the ECCC has had
material successes. It has investigated and prosecuted several individuals,
developed notable jurisprudence, and connected thousands of victims to
the proceedings.76
Indonesia should specifically look to the Cambodian court for
guidance when establishing its own court because Cambodia’s situation
is much like that of Indonesia. Indonesia should examine the ECCC’s
many innovative features to determine whether it could benefit
Indonesia’s own international judicial system. By using this ready-made
example from a country with many situational and cultural similarities,
Indonesia would not have to start its design from scratch, and could
improve upon the working, if inefficient, court design of the
Cambodians. This Part will explore the court’s structure and innovations,
and its successes and criticisms, in order to determine the best
organization for Indonesia’s court.
A. The Split Court
The ECCC was joint-established by the Royal Cambodian
Government and the UN, and it is located on-site in Cambodia.77 Like
other international tribunals, it has both local and international personnel,
and it applies a blend of domestic and international law.78 It is composed
of a pre-trial chamber and a trial chamber, each with five judges, and a
Supreme Court chamber with seven judges; it is the first tribunal that has
a majority of domestic judges in each chamber.79 The ECCC employs
both a Cambodian and international co-prosecutor and a co-investigating
judge.80 It also has a split funding scheme with separate financial support
for the domestic and international sides. 81 These somewhat divisive
features were designed to accommodate and respect Cambodian
sovereignty.82 While the UN pressed for an international prosecutor and
an international majority, the Royal Cambodian government wanted to
IN THE

COURTS OF CAMBODIA, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/judicial-chamber (last visited Apr. 9,
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retain sufficient political control of the court. 83 This is a legitimate
concern, as mass crimes have significant domestic importance, and
international courts can alienate locals from the process and
proceedings.84
The ECCC also implemented an ambitious outreach and victim
participation program that mostly has included free transportation for
hearings, public visits or other proceedings, as well as a civil party
participation system. 85 These things have led to notable successes,
including solid convictions and jurisprudence, positive capacity building,
and significant local involvement in the proceedings. 86 However, the
ECCC is seriously deficient in both original design and implementation.
B. Victim Participation
Victim participation is an important part of the hybrid court, since it
furthers an important interest in connecting locals to the criminal
process.87 It also promotes individual and social healing.88 Though the
ECCC did not have an explicit provision for victim outreach, it assigned
the Public Affairs Section (PAS) and the Victim’s Unit outreach
responsibilities.89 Funding and budget concerns limited the capabilities of
these two offices. The PAS circulated written materials and published a
website; however, much of that information has no ability to reach the
illiterate or those living in the rural countryside.90 Regardless, the PAS’s
efforts to connect locals—the victims and survivors—to the proceedings
of the court generated great success: The ECCC constructed the largest
public viewing gallery available at any mass crime tribunal and it
provided free transportation to the court in order to encourage public
visits.91 Members of the public can take part in a study tour or see the
actual court proceedings.92
The sheer number of participants has been unparalleled.93 In just
2012 alone, nearly 100,000 people were estimated to have visited the
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Id.
Dickinson, supra note 11, at 302 (indicating that “the lack of connection to local populations
has been problematic” in “purely international processes”).
85
Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 69, at 421, 426.
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Id. at 373; see generally id. at 380–77, 420–37.
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See id. at 420.
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See id. (“Victims can more easily observe or participate in the proceedings, which offer them
an opportunity to engage in truth-telling, contribute to the search for justice, and otherwise seek
empowerment and a degree of personal and collective reconciliation.”).
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Id.
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Id. at 421.
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Id. at 421–22.
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See Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 69, at 422.
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court.94 The number of total visitors from 2009 to the present is estimated
at 390,000.95 Of those who attended the trial hearings of Case 002,96
eighty-three percent were Cambodians who used the free transportation
provided. 97 Although the number of local participants is impressive,
some express doubts as to whether the participation actually leads to a
deeper understanding of the court and what it is trying to accomplish.98
Another important aspect of the ECCC’s victim participation is the
capacity for victims to join a suit as a civil party.99 During Case 001,
victims could submit complaints to the Co-Prosecutors and participate as
full parties. 100 The Internal Rules were changed during Case 002,
requiring victims to join a consolidated group represented by one
national lawyer and one international lawyer, decreasing individual
participation.101 In Case 002 the Pre-Trial Chamber initially admitted
almost 4,000 civil participants, but only 750 were ultimately retained.102
Reparations for the crimes were limited to those that are “collective and
moral,” and initially should be borne by those convicted,103 but many of
the requests in Case 001 were rejected because the accused was indigent,
and the court could not support the reparations.104 In future cases, victim
reparations will probably be supported by NGOs.105
C. Jurisprudence and the Development of the Rule of Law
Another praiseworthy success of the Cambodian court has been its
development of solid jurisprudence. The Cambodian court faced many
challenges, including political interference, a history of corruption and an
underdeveloped legal system.106 In addition, the majority of domestic

94
Id. (including study tours, court and VIP visits, video screenings, and school lectures in
addition to public hearing participation).
95
Id. (including study tours, court and VIP visits, video screenings, and school lectures in
addition to public hearing participation).
96
The Cambodian court’s caseload is divided up into four different cases, Cases 001, 002, 003,
and 004. Case 001 ended in conviction in 2012. Case 002 was split into two parts; the first trial
concluded in 2013, and the second trial began in 2014. Cases 003 and 004 are still in the judicial
investigation phase. Id.; see also Thomas Fuller & Julia Wallace, 2 Khmer Rouge Leaders Are
TIMES,
Aug.
6,
2014,
available
at
Convicted
in
Cambodia,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/world/asia/decades-after-khmer-rouges-rule-2-senior-leadersare-convicted-in-cambodia.html.
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judges left little room for UN control or guidance. 107 However, the
ECCC has shown its ability to confront difficult legal questions and to
apply norms of international law to controversial issues.108
There are several examples of sound jurisprudence by the ECCC;
one of the most notable was the ECCC’s decision on the applicability of
Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability (JCE). The JCE is used to connect
organizers and planners of crimes to those who executed the crimes for
them, and it has three theories of accountability. The ECCC accepted the
first two theories: JCE-1 (where the accused shares the intent to commit
the crime within the court’s jurisdiction) and JCE-2 (where the accused
has personal knowledge of ill-treatment and intent to further that
system). 109 But the more controversial JCE-3 (where the accused is
responsible for acts outside the scope of the plan, but were foreseeable)
was not accepted.110 The ECCC conducted a very comprehensive judicial
analysis and found that JCE-3 did not exist in customary international
law.111 Though this finding challenged an earlier ICTY case, it was based
on solid reasoning.112 This decision, as well as two others like it that
challenged national norms but provided sound and reasoned findings,113
shows that the ECCC was able to tackle difficult issues and provide
substantial evidence and reason to support its decision. This is a
significant feat for a court that struggles with political interference and
lacks a solid foundation in legal training.
Even though these applications of JCE are not binding law outside of
the ECCC’s jurisdiction, they still contribute to a lasting legacy of
Cambodian and international law. The JCE-3 finding was the first to
contradict the holding of the ICTY,114 and now that the existence of JCE3 in customary law has been questioned, investigations and discussions
on the subject will have to tackle that contradiction. While the law on the
subject was not changed by the ECCC, the ECCC’s ruling will have a
direct impact on the law’s development going forward. These
jurisprudential decisions were also the very first to challenge the norms
107

Id. at 373.
See id. at 380, 382.
109
Id. at 381.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 381–82.
113
The ECCC had two other good examples of sound jurisprudence. The first was a decision
that found that Duch, the accused person in Case 001, had been illegally detained before the trial,
and that this detention was a violation of his human rights. Id. at 382. One commenter observed that
“[t]his sort of challenge is unprecedented in modern Cambodian history and a great victory for the
rule of law.” Id. at 383. The other example came during the trial of Ieng Sary in Case 002. She had
previously been domestically pardoned for her violation of human rights. The court closely
examined the opinions of international, regional and state courts, and other human rights bodies, and
determined that the domestic pardoning was not in accordance with customary international law and
Cambodia’s treaty obligations. Id. at 384–86.
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laid out by domestic law, which is a victory for fair trials rights and the
rule of law in Cambodia115 and sets a good precedent for other struggling
judicial systems.
D. Capacity Building
Capacity building—promoting professional competence, legal
reform, and a culture of respect for law, as well as leaving an
informational legacy116—is one of the main potential benefits of a hybrid
court. 117 Although the ECCC was predicted to have notable legacy
value,118 in reality, it has had little extra resources and time to dedicate to
capacity building.119 Still, capacity building has occurred.
The initial outline for the ECCC mentioned the training of local
defense attorneys, but otherwise had no formal provision or structure for
capacity building.120 Later, in 2010, the Legacy Advisory Group and a
Legacy Secretariat were created, but they have remained mostly inactive
and there is general confusion as to whether the domestic or international
component has the responsibility or authority to take the lead on
capacity-building activities.121
Besides these obstacles, some capacity building has occurred, and
many of the important effects of capacity building will still take place
even though there is not a formal structure established. The ECCC has
established a few training programs,122 but much of the capacity building
has occurred through the interaction of domestic and international
personnel, and the more important effects will be felt just by having a
solid, positive example of a court in Cambodia.123 Many of the fair trial
concepts the ECCC uses, including the presumption of innocence and
clear legal justification for detention and sentencing, are not features of
the Cambodian judicial system, and some expect them to trickle down to
influence the local system.124 Some characteristics of the ECCC have
already been implemented in certain local Cambodian courts. 125 In
115
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addition, the locale of the court and the fact that proceedings take place
in the Khmer language make ECCC law an extremely good resource for
Cambodian law students and professionals.126
E. Struggles of the ECCC
Although positive results are coming from the ECCC, it has
struggled with serious obstacles. Some are obstacles that any
international-type tribunal faces, while others specifically come from the
unique structure of the ECCC. Many of the problems originate from the
split court structure and from the supermajority requirement.
The split court structure has resulted in delay, deadlock, and much
inefficiency. The process begins by preliminary submission from the CoProsecutors (CPs), and an investigation by the Co-Investigating Judges
(CIJs). 127 Because of the double-headed offices, both processes were
expected to take time; however, the CPs took one year to investigate the
first five suspects before their submission, and the CIJs investigated their
first subject for two years.128 Much time was wasted in this two-part
investigation, with the different parties doubling each other’s work.129
The inclusion of investigating judges was supposed to increase efficiency
by providing in-depth evidence that would then be verified in a brief
trial.130 Because this process works against the goals of a hybrid court, as
a substantial benefit of a mass crimes tribunal is realized by retelling the
story in a public forum and giving the public an eye into the proceedings.
In practice, the ECCC has produced an in-depth investigation and a fulllength trial, undermining the original efficiency purposes of the CIJs.131
The supermajority requirement was originally a prerequisite for UN
participation.132 However, from the experience of the ECCC, it can lead
to excessive delay and impasses.133 For example, when there is a dispute
between the Co-Prosecutors or Co-Investigating Judges about whether an
investigation should proceed, if there is no supermajority in the Pre-Trial
Chamber, the investigation will presumably proceed. Even though in the
case mentioned above there was a built-in procedure to overcome a
supermajority deadlock, it still resulted in a one-year delay. 134 Also,
while the Trial Chamber can only convict a person with the vote of at
least one international judge, there are no other guidelines given on how
126
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to address other split decisions the court faces. 135 With the current
Cambodian court structure, there are multiple points for disagreement
and deadlock, which have even proven to shield the decision makers
from accountability.136
The funding system also suffers because of the split court structure.
Each side is in charge of providing funding for its own expenses, which
has made the national side very vulnerable to underfunding.137 While
other international tribunals are supported by contributions from the UN
budget, the ECCC has relied mostly on funds from foreign donor
contributions.138 Only seventeen percent of the ECCC’s national funding
comes from the Cambodian Government. 139 This has led to several
funding crises as foreign suppliers have withheld funds because of
disapproval of court developments, mostly from the side of the
Cambodians. 140 As of 2013, the ECCC has already cost $204.6
million,141 and while this amount is significantly lower than the cost of
the ICTY or ICTR,142 the ECCC has cost more per case or individual
indicted. 143 The ECCC has also proven much more costly than was
initially estimated ($56 million), and though it has secured many funds
and has been a less-costly alternative to an international tribunal, it has
still been plagued by inefficiencies from the structure of the court.144
In sum, the Cambodian court was beleaguered by structural flaws,
inefficiencies, and funding difficulties. Many of the novel features of the
court, including the double team of prosecutors and investigating judges,
the domestic majority and supermajority requirements, as well as the
civil victim participation, contribute to unnecessary complications within
the court. Many times this has resulted in duplicate work, deadlock,
delays, or just ineffectiveness. However, the court has accomplished very
notable things, and has done so in the face of the overwhelming domestic
challenges of weak judicial and legal systems, rampant corruption and
potential political interference, and financial stresses and burdens. The
court has produced well-investigated, fair trial convictions of a number
135
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of people. The court has been a solid example of legal jurisprudence,
which is a shining beacon of hope to other struggling judicial systems,
and which speaks well about the ability of a court to help contribute to
the body of law in which it takes part. Finally, there has been a vast,
unprecedented amount of victim participation, giving evidence to the
idea that these undertakings will have palpable effects on those who
suffered because of crimes, and on the Cambodian society in general.
Mass crimes tribunals will fall short of the lofty goals allocated to
them; they can attempt to reach a sort of justice, but in significant ways,
their acts will never make up for the suffering, pain, loss of dignity, and
deprivation of life. However, international tribunals, and the ECCC
specifically, have still accomplished good things, taken small steps
toward justice, and made important contributions to modern international
law.145
V. ESTABLISHING A TRIBUNAL IN INDONESIA
Indonesia is a place where a mass crimes tribunal, if designed with
proper structure and procedures, could make great progress towards
adjudication and social healing. In order to avoid the pitfalls of the
ECCC while capitalizing on its successes, the Indonesian court should be
structured as an international hybrid court, with both domestic and
international judges. It should retain domestic and international CoProsecutors; however, the Investigating Judge should be from
international personnel. In addition, there should be a majority of
international judges in each court, but a modified supermajority rule,
requiring at least one domestic and one international judge vote to
proceed. Indonesia should also modify the victim participation scheme,
eliminating civil party participation while still maintaining as much
outreach and participation as possible. Lastly, Indonesia should use a
funding scheme similar to the ECCC’s. This structure will overcome
many of the efficiency struggles of the ECCC, but retain the
opportunities for domestic growth, victim participation and development
of good law.
A. A Hybrid Court
Although one of the main challenges to the efficiency of the ECCC
is the division of the court along international and domestic lines, it is
still very important that Indonesia establish a court with both domestic
and international characteristics. This hybrid structure provides many of
the same benefits as a fully international court, but it also enhances the
145
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court’s legitimacy, gives more opportunity for capacity building, and is
more affordable.
Strictly international and strictly domestic courts both suffer from
legitimacy problems. When dealing with mass crimes, these problems
become even more acute. The atrocity of the crimes necessitates
international adjudication and accountability, but domestically, the
government and the public want to maintain some sort of control of the
judicial process and the ensuing healing process. An exclusively
international court will lack perceived legitimacy from the populace,146
but an exclusively domestic court lacks legal legitimacy, especially in
situations like Indonesia’s, where the international community is very
dubious about the competence of the country’s legal system.147
A hybrid court remedies both of these situations. It requires close
collaboration between local and international authorities, and its on-site
location is structured to instruct the public and involve victims. It also
helps with judicial legitimacy in the eyes of the international community
and in the eyes of the populace. 148 Because Indonesia has resisted
international influence in the past, 149 and because the 1965 incident
remains a very sensitive issue, with suspected perpetrators still holding
positions of power,150 both the international and domestic aspects of a
hybrid court are needed.
Another asset of a hybrid court is its potential for capacity building,
which cannot occur in an international court run solely by foreigners.151
And with the challenges that face a justice system like Indonesia’s, a
purely domestic court would not receive the international expertise and
interchange that would help Indonesia’s system to progress. Furthermore,
Indonesia’s judicial system faces similar problems to that of Cambodia.
Corruption is rampant152—Cambodia and Indonesia have reported very
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similar judiciary bribe rates.153 They are also both trying to develop legal
systems after the reign of despotic leaders.154 Similarly, both systems
have been criticized for political interference.155 While Cambodia did not
have a formal structure set up for capacity building, some still
incidentally occurred, mostly because of the merging of domestic and
international personnel.156
In order to capitalize on this important benefit of hybrid courts, and
in order to avoid the lack of responsibility and thus lack of action,
Indonesia should appoint one international and one domestic director to
head a capacity building project. This way, legacy work will be a priority
and not just a by-product of the court. The legal reform that the court
could accomplish could very well be the most lasting benefit to
Indonesia’s political and judicial system. This appointment structure will
clearly establish responsibility on both sides and avoid the confusion
over accountability that the ECCC experienced.
Aside from legitimacy and capacity building, a hybrid court also has
the benefit of being more affordable. 157 At first blush, this is not a
strength of the ECCC, and admittedly, the Cambodian court costs much
more than expected and more per conviction than other tribunals.
However, the ECCC still functions millions and millions of dollars
below the cost of the ICTY and the ICTR, and by implementing the
structural changes suggested, an Indonesian court could come out with a
much lower price tag. Generally, courts on-site are more cost-effective
because investigations are less expensive, because there is closer access
to witnesses and evidence, and because salaries for local personnel are
typically much lower than those for higher qualified, international
personnel.158
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B. A Semi-Split Structure
Many of the inefficiencies of the ECCC can be chalked up to the
double team of prosecutors and investigating judges, and to the majority
of domestic judges sitting on the bench. 159 However, many of the
benefits of a hybrid court (greater local control, interaction that produces
capacity building, more effective social healing, etc.) would not be had
if, in practice, the court functioned like a full international tribunal. In
order to increase efficiency while still giving enough domestic control,
Indonesia’s court should have the following key differences in structure.
First, the domestic judge majority structure should be replaced by an
international judge majority structure. The ECCC’s supermajority should
also be modified to require the votes of one domestic judge and one
international judge in most decisions, with ex ante procedures laid out in
case of judicial deadlock. An international judge majority structure will
promote judicial independence, as international judges can be chosen
from a larger pool and have come from legal systems with histories of
judicial independence and integrity. 160 Although this structure will
detract from Indonesia’s control over the procedures, requiring both
international and domestic votes will give back some domestic power
while at the same time avoiding deadlocks like those that faced the
ECCC. This lower bar for the supermajority, while easier to achieve, will
undoubtedly still lead to many split courts. Indonesia should provide
presumptions for such circumstances and give preemptive guidance to
the judges about what should be done in case of an impasse. With these
procedures in place, Indonesia can anticipate and prevent deadlock,
maintain sufficient local control, and develop judicial legitimacy.
Secondly, Indonesia should retain both domestic and international
prosecutors, but retain only the international investigating judge and not
the domestic investigating judge. This also strikes a balance between
increasing the efficiency of the court while still preserving adequate
domestic control. The ECCC’s CPs and CIJs received criticism for
double work and inefficiency. 161 However, progress is bound to be
slower in a two-head office,162 and efficiency also needs to be balanced
with the capacity-building benefits provided by such an integrated office.
The greater burden on efficiency was the investigating judge (whose split
decisions caused detrimental delays in the ECCC) and the general
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lengthiness of the process brought on by the bifurcated office.163 What is
more, the prosecutors did not overly contribute to delays in the process,
and in other courts foreign and domestic prosecutors have successfully
worked together.164 Because of these things, Indonesia should institute
two Co-Prosecutors, while having just one international Investigating
Judge.
C. Victim Involvement
Victim participation is an important feature of the ECCC that the
Indonesian court should not neglect. Participation helps victims to
validate their suffering and it also allows for a cathartic release of hurt
and pain.165 It has therapeutic value for an audience taking part in the
story and validating the experience of the witness.166 The Cambodian
court had unprecedented victim participation and observation, and it also
provided the unique opportunity for victims to receive civil relief as part
of the proceedings,167 to connect Cambodians to the process, and to help
them toward closure and reconciliation. However, civil victim
participation is not a realistic source of reconciliation in a mass crimes
court. Only a fraction of those initially accepted as civil parties were
ultimately admitted to the Cambodian court, and they were joined into a
consolidated group and many did not receive the reparations they
sought.168 This particular feature is not worth the cost or effort, when a
simpler system of victim testimony and observation provides comparable
social benefits.
Indonesia, like Cambodia, needs to implement victim participation.
Millions of people were directly affected by the brutalities that
occurred,169 and there is still much cultural hostility toward the targeted
groups.170 Having a public forum where the particular suffering of those
people is vindicated would do much for their personal healing171 as well
as help shift the overall public attitude toward those people and those
events.172 Indonesia should remove the civil recovery aspect of victim
163
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Commissions, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 125, 130 (explaining how truth and reconciliation
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participation, and have a model closer to that of the ICC, 173 where
victims may apply to take part in the proceedings, may appoint legal
representation, or may have it appointed to them. Through their legal
counsel, the victims may participate in all stages of the proceedings by
attending hearings and voicing their concerns directly to the judge
deciding the course of action for investigation or in levying accusations
against a defendant. While implementing this type of system, Indonesia
should also replicate the impressive victim involvement of the ECCC,
and provide ample opportunity for observation of proceedings. Progress
toward reconciliation requires justice to be done and requires that it be
seen being done. 174 Indonesia should also prioritize free public
transportation for tours and study groups. Circulated materials and an
informational website could potentially reach a high percentage of
Indonesia’s people, as its literacy rate is notably higher than Cambodia’s.
These things will provide the societal benefits of victim participation,
while at the same time reducing cost and inefficiency by removing a
resource-draining, ineffective civil relief system.
D. Funding
Indonesia should implement a funding system similar to Cambodia’s,
split along domestic and international lines. 175 Although Cambodia’s
split-funding scheme led to several financial crises, it still managed to
produce sufficient funds. The hybrid structure of the court helped secure
contributions from donors who wanted to see the process continued.176
The court is kept on a constant financial precipice and critics wonder if
“donor’s fatigue” detracts from the work the court could accomplish.177
But this system does provide another source of international oversight for
the court. Also, if Indonesia designs a court with more international
components, showing a willingness to concede on potentially
problematic features, it could gain more legitimacy in the eyes of
international contributors, and Indonesia might not have as difficult a
time securing funds as Cambodia.
commissions can help change societal beliefs and attitudes by providing new information from a
credible source).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, there are many things that Indonesia could do to improve
upon the model of the Cambodian court. However, it is almost
impossible to predict a tribunal’s success from the outset, in part because
defining the success of a court is not a simple task.178 Constructing a
court from the Cambodia model then becomes a balancing test. It was
easy to see, in hindsight, the weaknesses of the court’s structure, and
these things should be taken in consideration of the particular goals,
interests, and circumstances of Indonesia.
The Cambodian court was plagued by inefficiencies and excessive
expenditures, but it was able to produce good jurisprudence, thorough
investigations and convictions, in the face of political interference and
corruption. Many of the structural features of the Cambodian court came
about because Cambodia wanted to maintain sufficient control over it.179
Although Indonesia also has a strong interest in sovereignty and political
independence, these interests need to be balanced, and some features
need to be altered in order to avoid the weaknesses of the ECCC.
Because of this, Indonesia should apply a more international design than
that of Cambodia. The majority of judges should be international rather
than domestic, and they should retain a semi-split court system with two
prosecutors but only one international investigating judge. With these
features, Indonesia will run a more efficient court, while at the same time
gaining more legitimacy in the international community. Retaining part
of the split court structure will also help with the interaction between
domestic and international personnel, and the information sharing and
capacity building that goes along with it. There are some features of the
ECCC that Indonesia should strive to replicate. Victim participation is a
vital component, and if any closure, reconciliation, and healing are to
take place, it needs to be prioritized. Capacity building and the
development of good jurisprudence will help the court to share its legacy
with Indonesia’s domestic system, and the greater rule of law.
Establishing a mass crimes tribunal is a colossal undertaking, and
there are high stakes involved on all sides. The sheer egregiousness of
the crimes calls out for attention from the international community, the
local community, and the victims in particular, and there are significant
considerations to balance while trying to serve the interests of these
parties. An international tribunal has more far-reaching effects than
merely bringing perpetrators of human rights crimes to justice. It can
178
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bring individual and social healing through telling the story of the
victims, thus bringing recognition and vindication of their pain and
public condemnation upon the responsible parties. It can also bring social
healing by publically acknowledging a crime that, especially in
Indonesia’s case, for years continued undiscussed and its survivors
stigmatized. A tribunal can also do much to help a country’s legitimacy
and the development of its legal system. Taking the time, money, and
effort to develop and implement a system shows acceptance of the
international standard of human rights, and also proves a willingness and
a devotion to that standard. Finally a tribunal is important on an
international level. It helps with the development of the rule of law
generally, by providing more defense of and advocacy for human rights,
and can help in very specific ways, by redefining terms and eking out
what the customary standards should be.
A mass crimes tribunal is a worthwhile undertaking. There are things
that take place in our world that should never happen in a humane
society. Even though our ways of correcting these things, or just
addressing them, are not perfect, they still need to be done. A tribunal is
important in its own right, if only to assure humanity that we will
undertake the impossible, because other atrocities deserve our attention.
If we can make any small steps towards a better, more humane world,
toward reconciliation for victims, and toward a better law for the future,
then that is what we should do.
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